Mumbai Press Center

October 4, 2026 | [EDITORIAL] Analysis: Why the Digital Duty of Care Exposure Draft Must Be Withdrawn

On September 8, 2026, the Australian Government released an exposure draft of the "Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026" for public consultation.

Freedom Publishers Union opposes this Bill in its current form.

It places in the hands of a Minister and a regulator an open-ended power over what Australians can say, see and share online.

We say this while recognizing that parts of the draft are worthwhile.

We will name them.

But the foundation is wrong, and no amount of good intention in the detail repairs a bad foundation.

Free Speech - Our Core Principle

Before examining the specifics, we reaffirm the principle that governs everything we do.

Freedom Publishers Union firmly believes in, and stands for, free speech as the core principle of our entire global operations.

We declare any measure or system which impedes free speech, intentionally or unintentionally, to be censorship.

We believe free speech is an inherent human right of all citizens of the world, and we will continue to condemn governments that seek to impose on it.

This belief informs our opposition to the draft.

Timeline and Democratic Concerns

Key dates in this process:

• 2024: Digital duty of care legislation first planned, then shelved while the Government pursued social media age restrictions
• December 2025: Legislation revived, with an open consultation period
• May 2026: Government issues paper on a duty of care framework released
• September 8, 2026: Exposure draft released
• Late September 2026: Public consultation on the exposure draft closed

The 2024 and December 2025 dates are as reported by Professor Lisa Given of RMIT University in The Conversation (September 8, 2026), which also reports that the Government expects to introduce the Bill to Parliament this year.

A framework of this size, covering social media services, search engines, app stores, hosting services, AI services and more, demands the most thorough public scrutiny.

Ministerial discretion is built into the Bill at almost every level, and much of it will be exercised by legislative instrument after the Bill passes.

Parliament and the public are being asked to approve a framework whose real content is yet to be written.

The draft itself is unfinished: its simplified outlines are still marked "to be drafted".

We will continue to voice our concerns through every available channel until the draft is withdrawn or fundamentally rewritten.

The Government's Framing

The Government presents the duty of care as a basic safety standard for online products.

As reported by The Conversation, Minister for Communications Anika Wells has compared it to the standards we apply to cars, toys and food.

The Government also says it is about giving people control over their own feeds, including a choice between algorithmic recommendations and content from the people they follow.

However, we at Freedom Publishers Union look at what the text does.

A car does not publish opinions.

A toy does not host political argument.

The comparison collapses the moment the product is speech.

The Bill defines a "safe online environment" primarily by reference to harmful material and conduct.

That is content.

The talk of design features and algorithms is the public face; the content standard is the engine.

What We Support

Freedom Publishers Union is not opposed to every provision in this draft.

Where the Bill is specific, narrow and aimed at genuine abuse, we support it.

• "Nudify" apps and websites. Allowing the Commissioner to require app stores and search engines to remove apps and websites designed for, or predominantly used for, generating fake nude material (s 86B) is a targeted measure aimed at a clear abuse.
• Child sexual exploitation protections, for children. Strong protection is right. It must stay confined to children. Applied to adults, it becomes a vehicle for censorship.
• User empowerment tools (s 26(6)). Tools that let people manage how design features operate for them put the choice with the user. We support that wholeheartedly. We do not support a Minister dictating which tools must exist and how they work (s 26(4)-(5)).
• Transparency on account removals (s 192M(2)(d)). Allowing the Commissioner to require platforms to publish how many Australian accounts they suspend or remove, including the reasons, is overdue and welcome.

We also acknowledge the exception for lawful private communications between consenting adults (s 26(7)).

It is welcome.

It is also narrow, and it does nothing for public speech.

A Duty Defined by Content, Expanded by a Minister

Sections 25C and 25D list the "seriously harmful" material, and the material "harmful to children", that every online service must, so far as is reasonably practicable, guard against (s 26(1)).

The lists are not closed.

The Minister may add new categories by legislative instrument if satisfied the material "may" cause serious harm (s 25C(2)), or may cause harm to children (s 25D(2)).

Section 25D(1)(f) adds a further catch-all for anything that "could inflict serious harm to a child".

There is no requirement for evidence.

There is no requirement that the harm be real rather than hypothetical.

The safeguards are thin.

Parliament can disallow these instruments, and the Minister must first seek the Commissioner's advice and have regard to it (s 27B).

Neither step requires evidence of actual harm.

As the Institute of Public Affairs (IPA) notes, disallowance places the initial political onus on opponents and offers only imperfect oversight.

This is the power to redefine, by ministerial instrument, what Australians may be exposed to.

Vague Definitions, Subjective Standards

Even the listed harms are not all clear.

Section 25C(1)(j) covers material or conduct that encourages, promotes, incites or provides instruction for "the commission of a criminal offence".

As the IPA notes, across Australia's nine jurisdictions that includes a wide range of speech-related offenses, and it might even reach news reporting, documentaries and films that portray crime.

Does it reach a documentary about organized crime?

A news report on a protest?

A film?

Section 25D(1)(c) deems harmful to children any material or conduct that "encourages or promotes hostile attitudes towards women or gender equality".

Who decides what is "hostile"?

Who decides what is "equality"?

The IPA warns this may mean children cannot access information about traditional gender roles, including those rooted in religious belief.

These ambiguities create exactly the chilling effect we warned of in 2024.

Individuals and publishers will self-censor out of fear of an ill-defined standard.

The inclusion of such a politically loaded provision can also be read as a signal of the kinds of harms a future Minister may choose to add.

Section 25G: Much Too Broad

Section 25G declares that recommender features, logged-in features, endless-feed features, feedback features and time-limited features "are taken to have negative behavioural impacts".

The Minister may add more by instrument (s 25G(2)), and may also decide which services count as social media services (s 25B(2)).

Where this bites is social media.

Section 25B(1)(c) requires those services to ensure these features do not operate for children under 16.

This is not evidence-based regulation.

It is a legislative conclusion, declared in advance, about the core design features of modern social media.

For under-16s, the Bill treats a feature that helps a small publisher reach readers the same as one designed to hook a child.

We oppose section 25G in its current form.

Childproofing the Internet for Everyone

The Bill sets two standards: one for all users, and a stricter one for children.

We support protecting children.

We do not support a design in which the stricter standard becomes the standard for everyone.

Services will face a choice.

They can verify the age of every user, or they can apply the child standard to everyone.

As the IPA argues, for general interest websites and for services with no direct view of who their users are, such as hosting providers, the cheaper option may be to restrict everything.

Adults could then lose access to lawful material, or be forced to prove who they are to access lawful speech.

This conflicts directly with the principles of an open and free internet.

Children's safety is a legitimate aim.

Turning the whole internet into a children's environment to achieve it is not.

Liability Without Limits

The Bill makes platform operators responsible, so far as is reasonably practicable, for the environment they host, including content posted by their users.

Failure to comply carries a civil penalty of 60,000 penalty units (s 26B).

The IPA puts that at more than $20 million, rising to over $100 million for companies.

At the current Commonwealth penalty unit value of $364, 60,000 units comes to about $21.8 million.

All figures are in Australian dollars.

The same penalty applies to failing to follow a remedial direction from the Commissioner (s 26D(3)).

Providers must also complete written risk assessments of "all reasonably foreseeable risks", covering content, design features and systems, keep them for at least six years, and hand them over within 30 days of a request (s 26A).

The Commissioner can set additional standards, benchmarks and metrics for these assessments.

What does a rational operator do when faced with vague obligations, a discretionary regulator and penalties that can exceed $100 million?

It removes first.

It restricts and censors widely.

It treats lawful but controversial speech as risk to be eliminated.

As the IPA argues, because services interact with one another, hosting providers and app stores will want common standards from their clients, and the Commissioner can encourage that through guidelines (s 26E) and by setting benchmarks and metrics for risk assessments (s 26A(2)(f)).

The result is a single restrictive standard that Australians cannot opt out of.

Sock Puppets: A Definite No

Section 205J authorizes the Commissioner to assume a "sock puppet identity", a false or fictitious identity (s 205G), for the purposes of performing any of the Commissioner's functions or exercising any of the Commissioner's powers under the Act.

This applies despite any other law, and despite any agreement, contract, deed, policy or other document.

Section 205K(2) goes further.

It authorizes the Commissioner to use these identities to generate material using an online service, including by means of artificial intelligence, to the extent that producing, disseminating or possessing that material is not itself an offense.

Section 205L gives immunity from civil proceedings for acts done in good faith under these powers (and under the similar researcher power in s 205H).

Let us be crystal clear: a regulator that can invent identities, generate and spread content under them, and is shielded from civil suit when it does so in good faith, is open to disinformation, misinformation and government propaganda unsupported by research or data.

These are the very harms a safety regulator is supposed to protect us from.

A watchdog that can pose as the public is no longer a watchdog.

We do not support these provisions, and we oppose them.

They must be removed.

Journalists and Sources: Weak Protection

The Bill adds to the Commissioner's investigative powers, including the power to summon people to give evidence under oath (ss 199-200).

Self-incrimination is no excuse for refusing (s 205(1)), although s 205(2) limits how an individual's answers can be used against them in most other proceedings.

Failing to comply with a notice, or refusing to take an oath or affirmation, is an offense carrying up to 12 months in prison, with a civil penalty alternative (s 204).

The only journalist-specific protection in the draft is a narrow exception for a journalist who would have to disclose the identity of a confidential source in complying with a notice (s 204(5)).

It does not cover refusing to take an oath, and the journalist bears an evidential burden: they must raise evidence that the exception applies.

That is a weak exemption for journalists and source protection.

A free press cannot operate on a single carve-out and the assumption that the regulator will use its powers wisely.

This is dangerous, and the potential threat to a free press is extremely concerning.

Existing Laws, Redundant Reach

Child exploitation and terrorist material should be the sole focus of any measure like this.

Criminal offenses covering both already exist.

In its current form the duty of care largely duplicates them for the harms that matter most, and overreaches for everything else.

We recognize that gaps may exist.

Professor Joel Scanlan of the University of Tasmania, writing in The Conversation (September 15, 2026), identifies one.

Australia's one reporting law for child abuse material, s 474.25 of the Criminal Code, is narrow in scope and does not require anyone to look.

Scanlan argues that the Bill, as drafted, would not require platforms to look for online harms, nor to tell anyone in Australia what they find.

He also notes that the Bill would repeal the existing Basic Online Safety Expectations, which currently tell platforms to proactively detect child abuse material.

The answer to that gap is a targeted, clearly drafted obligation to detect and report such material.

It is not a general duty across the entire internet, with a Minister deciding what counts as harm.

The Political Context

The IPA submission notes that the Prime Minister and the Minister for Communications have repeatedly linked the recent success of One Nation to social media and algorithms, and that two Greens senators have said part of their interest in the Bill is to limit how algorithms amplify One Nation's messages.

The Opposition Leader, Angus Taylor, says the Bill is an attempt to "censor" the internet, as reported by The Conversation.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese rejects that claim and says the Bill is about giving people control over what they see.

We do not need to take sides in that argument to see the danger.

Powers written for one purpose can be used for another.

Today, they may be aimed at harms most people agree on.

Tomorrow, they could be turned against political dissent, unpopular opinions, or any speech that challenges those in power.

Call to Action

The "Online Safety Amendment (Digital Duty of Care) Bill 2026" in its current form represents a serious threat to freedom of speech and information in Australia.

Its open-ended ministerial powers, its vague and subjective harms, its sweeping design feature declarations, its crushing penalties, and its sock puppet provisions are fundamentally incompatible with a free and open society.

Freedom Publishers Union calls on the Australian Government to:

• Withdraw the exposure draft in its current form
• Remove the Minister's power to expand, by instrument, the categories of harmful material and conduct (ss 25C(2) and 25D(2)) and of negative behavioural impacts (s 25G(2))
• Strike section 25G, together with the provisions that depend on it
• Strike section 205J, section 205K(2), and the immunity in section 205L as it applies to them
• Legislate the nudify removal powers, child exploitation protections, user empowerment tools and account removal transparency on their own terms
• Provide real, enforceable protection for journalists and their sources

We call on all Australians who value their right to free expression to write to their representatives, spread awareness, and make their voices heard.

The fight for free speech is never truly won; it requires constant vigilance.

An Australia that is safe for children does not require an internet that is unfree for adults.

Freedom Publishers Union reaffirms its commitment to the principles of free speech and open discourse.

We will continue to stand as a bulwark against government overreach and censorship, today and always.

The free exchange of ideas is not just a right; it is the lifeblood of a thriving democracy.

We must protect it at all costs.

Asia/Pacific Press Office - Mumbai Press Center

Written by The Editorial Board.